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Abstract 
The failure of safety critical petroleum assets (SCPA) is often accompanied by devastating 
safety consequences. The conceptualisation, design and construction of SCPA need to 
integrate factors that will maintain the asset’s lifecycle integrity. In this paper, a risk-based 
assessment of a case petroleum pipeline asset in Nigeria was used to examine the project 
conceptualisation phase of an asset. The paper adopts a case study method, semi-structured 
interviews, field observations and drew on pipeline failure data. Key managerial issues that 
need to be considered in project conceptualisation for SCPA were identified. These issues 
include consideration for risk receptors and the need to assess organisational capabilities with 
respect to owning, operating and regulating SCPA. The paper contributes theoretically by 
providing a performance-based learning framework for the conceptualisation of new SCPA. 
Key words: Project conceptualisation learning, Asset integrity, Safety critical petroleum 
asset(s), Risk management, Performance-based learning. 
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1 Introduction  
Safety critical petroleum assets (SCPA) such as high-pressure pipelines play a vital role in the 
supply of volatile products around the world [1].  Operators are required to demonstrate the 
integrity of their assets, and assess and mitigate risks in a context that accommodates 
stakeholder interests, including people who would be involved or affected by the construction 
and operations of the assets [1]–[3]. The construction of SCPA should, therefore, integrate 
factors that will ensure that integrity is maintained throughout its operational lifecycle [4]. 
Project conceptualisation provides a phase in project lifecycle where ideas and information 
regarding the design and construction of SCPA can be generated and utilised to ensure 
minimal failure [4].  Project conceptualisation phase has been described by Akbar and 
Mandurah [5] as an important stage of defining the project scope upon which project 
management activities are planned and delivered [6]–[9]. The conceptualisation phase is seen 
as central to project management processes [10] and crystallises ideas into a well-defined 
concept [11]–[15].  
Highlighting the importance of project conceptualisation is critical because as much as 80 per 
cent of a product can be specified in this early phase [16], [17]. For SCPA this is where 
design and construction should take into consideration the need for optimal asset integrity 
during operations without which failure with impact to safety (human and environmental 
safety, and asset safety) is eminent [4].  Unfortunately, this is not always the case even with 
world leading oil and gas companies. Examples of known SCPA that have catastrophically 
failed due to issues related to poor conceptualisation include the 1976 Piper Alpha [18] and 
the 2010 Deep Water Horizon disaster [19].  Designs for both cases did not consider the 
sociotechnical perspectives of the assets. The September 2010 catastrophic San Bruno 
pipeline accident is also another example of a SCPA that was owned, operated, and 
maintained in light of deficiencies in public awareness programs [20]. Yet, it appears that the 
global petroleum industry has learned little (if any) lessons from these case examples. The 
current controversy surrounding the North Dakota Access Pipeline is an example of an 
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ongoing SCPA project with poor project conceptualisation regime. Moreover, similar asset 
integrity issues have been reported in Mexico, Colombia, Nigeria, Indonesia, USA, UK, 
Canada, Iran, Iraq, Russia, Colombia and Saudi Arabia, where poor project conceptualisation 
contributes to poor asset safety and integrity performance [21]. Indeed, based on these 
examples there is a need to pay attention to the conceptualisation of SCPA projects. 
As established from the reviewed literature, research focused on project conceptualisation 
pays greater attention on how to systematically extract and disseminate management lessons 
within projects [22], [23], how to share knowledge across projects [9], [24]–[26], and the role 
of stakeholders in project conceptualisation [27]–[30]. However, an ignored factor which is 
critical in the case of SCPA is the need to integrate knowledge of the performance of existing 
assets (especially similar SCPA) whilst conceptualising new projects. Consequently, 
operators are unable to learn from the performance of existing SCPA in conceptualising new 
projects as seen in the aforementioned examples [18]–[20]. Hence, this study focusses on the 
identification of issues related to the risk and sociotechnical operational deficiencies of the 
SCPA, and how the conceptualisation of new SCPA projects can learn from these issues. 
This is an area still needing theoretical development, what Edmundson and McManus [31] 
would label as intermediate theory. Accordingly, a hybrid approach using quantitative and 
qualitative data from a detailed case study of the management of challenging pipeline asset 
Nigeria’s [21], [32] can provide the basis for improved approaches to project 
conceptualisation of SCPA. Consequently, we assessed the risk associated with the case 
pipelines and analysed how the sociotechnical operational deficiencies interact to weaken its 
safety and integrity performance [33], [34] whilst identifying project conceptualisation 
learning points. The case study is a good example of SPCAs in the petroleum industry, in a 
country that is dependent on petroleum resources for the national economy with particular 
complexity [21], [32] but not unusual in natural resources rich countries. As such it can 
exemplify the general challenge of conceptualisation of a SCPA while learning from its 
performance to inform the conceptualisation of new assets as explained in section 3. The 
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methodological choice of case study hybrid research is supported by project learning literature 
[33], [34]. The paper identifies some of the key managerial issues that need to be considered 
in project conceptualisation for SCPA and contributes theoretically by expanding the project-
based learning framework [17], [22], [24], [25] to performance-based, hence, answering the 
call by Folds [37] on the need for research with practical systems engineering implications. 
The paper is structured as follows: the next section theorises project conceptualisation 
learning and asset integrity. This is followed by an appraisal of the case study. An explanation 
of the method employed to achieve the research aim is covered in section four. Section five, 
six and seven presented result and discussion, managerial and practical implication, and 
theoretical contribution of the paper respectively. Section 8 is the conclusion.  
2 Theorising project conceptualisation learning and asset integrity 
Metcalfe and Lynch [38] asserts the need to approach project conceptualisation as a 
continuous process across project lifecycle. They criticised the fact that project 
conceptualisation is normally thought of as something completed at the outset of a project. 
This dynamic view of project conceptualisation, offers an opportunity to learn within and 
across projects for the attainment of organisational success. But how important is project 
learning to achieving organisational success? To explore this, we turn on the literature on 
project learning as a subset of organisational learning. 
A number of authors [36], [39], [40] agree that project learning is important particularly for 
the attainment of organisational learning [41], knowledge sharing success in project-based 
organisations [24], [25] and as a mean of retaining project maturity within an organisation 
[42]. William et al [43] identified project learning as a means of optimising risk management 
and planning capabilities across projects. Other researchers considered project learning as a 
medium for improving decision making within and cross projects [22], [23] and enhancing 
stakeholder engagement [3]. Indeed, the literature supports the importance of project learning 
to organisational success in various ways. However, in reality project learning rarely happens 
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[41], and in many instances, fails to deliver the intended results [44]. So, what supports or 
inhibits project learning? 
Learning within and across projects is a complex process and requires optimal attention, 
process and resources [45]. Indeed, when project learning is captured either via process-based 
or documentation-based methods [46], the extraction of new project management knowledge 
(tacit and/or explicit [47]) happens if actors process and establish systems and practices [48] 
with supportive learning culture, organisational and communication structures [35]. This will 
allow project learning to flourish through knowledge sharing by storey telling, practice, and 
systematic thinking [49], [50]. However, because of the temporary nature of project 
organisation, time pressure and decentralised nature of project environment, learning can be 
inhibited [51]. Hence, to overcome some of these inhibitors, Milton [44], [52] believes that 
learning should start at the conceptualisation phase of the project so that project begins with 
complete knowledge. Moreover, adopting a dynamic view of project conceptualisation [38] 
will allow for continuous integration of learning. Furthermore, from a project 
conceptualisation theoretical perspective, a system approach introduced in Whelton and 
Ballard [53] and further contextualised by Ballard [54] provides the framework which we 
have used as theoretical conception of how project-based learning can be achieved within and 
across project management processes in SPCA projects.  
The approach by Whelton and Ballard considered two motions in a project conceptualisation 
conversation and concept thinking. The first is the circular motion between the three primary 
elements: Ends (set of project goals), Means (set of process actions and decision rules) and 
Constraints as shown in Figure 1. Purposes are formed in conversation with design concepts 
and constraints, then the means for achieving those purposes are specified as characteristics of 
the asset to be designed and constructed, then finally those values are translated into technical 
specifications [17], [53], [54]. For instance, if the purpose is to construct a pipeline asset, one 
value is ‘asset integrity’, and the design criteria can be an asset with acceptable risk level. 
Meaning that the design and operation must demonstrate that the cost involved in reducing the 
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risk further would be grossly disproportionate to the benefit gained, known as the ALARP (as 
low as reasonably practicable) principle [4].  
 
Figure 1: Project definition process. Adapted from Ballard [54]. 
The second developmental motion occurs within means, and consists first of design concepts 
for how an asset is to be used; referred to Figure 1 as “operation design”. The idea is to first 
determine how an asset will be used before trying to design the asset. Once the asset’s use is 
determined, attention can turn to design of the asset itself and how to construct the asset [17]. 
Hence, in establishing how a new asset will be used, the integrity performance of similar asset 
can be sought and lesson drawn from it. 
Juxtaposing on the first motion between the three primary elements defined by Whelton and 
Ballard, and by adopting Metcalfe and Lynch’s [38] dynamic view of project 
conceptualisation, the link between project conceptualisation, project-based learning and asset 
integrity can be established using the connection between purpose, value and design criteria. 
For SCPA the value (e.g. asset integrity) element in project conceptualisation outlines the 
ability of the asset to perform its required functions effectively and efficiently with optimal 
protection to health, safety and the environment. It also outlines the means of ensuring that 
adequate sociotechnical systems and processes are in place to deliver asset integrity without 
which the project product will be considered ill-conceived. Indeed, because of the 
sociotechnical context of delivering an optimised asset integrity [33], [37], [55]–[57] in SCPA 
projects and the need for understanding the safety consequence of failure of such assets [58], 
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the link between project conceptualisation and learning needs to go beyond project 
management processes. Project conceptualisation needs to learn from similar sociotechnical 
systems. This is because design criteria element (e.g. risk from asset must be ALARP), for 
instance, establishes links between the asset conceptualisation and the varying acceptability of 
risk emanating from such asset from both individual and societal risk perspectives [59], [60]. 
For example, in the Netherlands, risk level must be less than 1E–6 per year to be adjudged 
acceptable for new assets [61].  The Western Australia’s maximum acceptable risk level also 
stands at 1E–6 [62].  In the UK, an individual and societal risk limit has been established in BS 
PD8010-3 [2]. These examples demonstrate how individuals and societies often set-up 
acceptable risk levels, with a view to conceptualising, designing and operating assets with risk 
levels to what can be termed ‘bearable’. The decision process on the acceptability of risk is 
generally based on risk acceptance criteria, stakeholder’s perception, environmental 
consideration and lessons from past incidents, with the view of using such criteria as a tool to 
facilitate decision making [60]–[63]. Assets designed and constructed without this 
consideration are likely to have poor integrity and safety performance throughout their 
operational lifecycle [4]. Hence, it is important for the project delivery process of SCPA to 
learn within and across projects as effectively captured by Whelton and Ballard [53] and 
supported by many project learning literature [22], [24]–[26], but also important to integrate 
the knowledge of performance of similar assets. 
We adopted Whelton and Ballard’s theoretical framework as a theoretical lens for conducting 
a risk based-study that exposes the effect of poor project conceptualisation. However, their 
framework focuses on project-based learning via “reflection cycles”, and therefore limits 
learning to project management processes. To overcome this limitation, the theoretical 
conception has been protracted beyond project management processes by integrating lessons 
from the knowledge of performance of similar project products. To achieve this, the next 
section lays out the problematic dimensions of the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation 
(NNPC) pipelines and provides justification for the case selection. 
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3 The case pipeline system in Nigeria: the intervention context 
The pipelines covered within this research constitute the 5001 kilometre(km) transmission 
system for liquid petroleum products in Nigeria which moves large quantity of products from 
refineries in Kaduna and Warri, and two in Port Harcourt, and import jetties to local 
distribution depots as shown in Figure 2 [64]. Mainline pipes, pumps, and compressor and 
booster stations, and other facilities that form the transmission system are all considered 
within the terminology “pipeline system”. The pipeline system is strategically located across 
the country and classified into five regions of operations. NNPC own and operate the asset via 
its subsidiary the Pipeline Product Marketing Company (PPMC).  
 
Figure 2: Map of Nigeria showing pipe network and petroleum depots  
Adapted from: NNPC [64] and PPPRA[65] 
 
The NNPC pipelines represent an example of a SCPA with challenging socio-economic and 
political problems affecting the safety and integrity of the pipeline. At the core of this 
problem is the issue of interdiction and sabotage [21], [32]. In 2011 for instance, NNPC 
reported a total of 2,787 line failures out of which 2,768 were the result of interdiction, while 
19 cases were due to material deterioration. Research (e.g., [66], [67]) further illustrates the 
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complex causal dimensions of such interdictions on the pipelines including theft by well-
equipped actors and deliberate sabotage due to the politics of petroleum resource in Nigeria. 
Indeed, Ogwu [68] also asserted that these causations has been disputed by host communities 
and linked to the surface exposure of the pipelines. Whether other failure causation can be 
identified beyond the scholarly focus on socio-economic and political dimension of 
interdiction and sabotage and how this link to the pipeline’s design is and construction 
dynamics remains unknown; hence, an in-depth understanding is required to provide a source 
of lesson for the conceptualisation of new SCPA. The sociotechnical operating context of the 
pipelines is not also without blame [32]. For instance, because a large section on the pipeline 
network was constructed in 1978/80 with a limited lifespan of 20 years, material and 
protection deterioration has contributed to corrosion and impact damage due, surface 
exposure from erosion [69]. Furthermore, Omeje [70], Engobo [71] and Ambituuni et al. [66] 
attributed the causes of failures to operational deficiencies including poor practices and 
bureaucratic bottlenecks. However, it remains unknown how these deficiencies interact to 
weaken failure prevention barriers and the link to the design and construction of the pipelines. 
As theoretically established in section 2, the effective conceptualisation of SCPA and the 
optimisation of project delivery processes can be achieved via project based learning [22], 
[23] with implication for organisational learning [39] and success [42], [43]. However, this 
does not guaranty the integration and optimal consideration of human interactions with the 
asset’s systems, a critical dimension of integrity performance for SCPA. Indeed, we have seen 
numerous failures of the case pipelines, linked to sociotechnical deficiencies, thereby, 
suggesting a failure in sociotechnical integration. For instance, the December 26th, 2006 
pipeline explosion in Ilado-Odo around Lagos in Nigeria which killed more than 250 people 
was attributed to pipeline rupture and explosion caused by material defects and poor 
emergency responds [67]. Similarly, a pipeline rupture and explosion at Jesse community on 
the 15th October 1998 resulted in large scale pollution and killed over 1,500 people [71]. The 
question, therefore, is how can the failure and consequence causations of the pipelines be 
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identified to inform managerial practice with implementable actions via project 
conceptualisation? We broke this down into three research questions as follow: 
 RQ1: How are risk variables (i.e., the frequency and consequences of failure) of the 
pipelines linked to project conceptualisation?  
 RQ 2: How does sociotechnical deficiencies of the pipelines hierarchically interact to 
weaken failure prevention barriers and how is this linked to project 
conceptualisation? 
 RQ 3: How can the conceptualisation of SCPA projects learn from the pipeline’s 
integrity performance and sociotechnical deficiencies?  
To address these questions, we adopt a case study method [72], [73], for this intermediate 
theory research [31], employing  a focussed lens to illuminate the risk and sociotechnical 
problems, hence providing an in-depth understanding of failure causations upon which the 
conceptualisation of SCPA can learn from. 
4 Method 
The research adopts Yin’s [72], [73] explanatory case study methodology as it is particularly 
suitable for answering “how” and “why” questions, and for exploring “system bounds” [74]. 
Case study provides a robust method particularly when a holistic, in-depth investigation is 
required [75]. Indeed, the choice of a case study allowed for the pipelines to be studied in its 
“real world” unique sociotechnical context and the challenges it poses to reveal interesting 
insights on lessons to be learned in the conceptualisation of new pipelines for optimising 
safety and integrity. In addition, the adoption of a case study also allowed the utilisation of 
both qualitative and quantitative data and mixed analytical method in a way that ensured the 
research aim was achieved within an environment rich with contextual variables [75]. The 
method allowed us to empirically identify practical dimensions that needed to be considered 
in project conceptualisation given the already existing knowledge on the case pipelines (e.g., 
[21], [32]), and to draw on existing knowledge in order to provide new perspectives for 
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project conceptualisation learning. By doing this, we aligned our methodological fit to 
Edmondson and McManus [31] intermediate theory. Indeed, because the NNPC pipelines 
exist within a sociotechnical context, we adopted Rasmussen’s framework as a way of 
conducting a hierarchical sociotechnical study of the system. Similar approach has been used 
to study sociotechnical systems by Trotter et al. [76]. The cited case examples of failures of 
SCPA opened the need for risk-based research.  
Yin’s [73] five components of an effective case study research design were applied: (1) 
research questions; (2) propositions or purpose of study; (3) unit analysis; (4) logic that links 
data to propositions; and (5) criteria for interpreting findings. The explanatory case study was 
used to answer questions that sought to explain the causal links in real-life interventions that 
are too complex for the survey or experimental strategies, through pattern matching achieved 
by series of iterations to examine the data closely at both surface and deep levels. The 
questions we tackled drew from the paper’s problem context, aim and theoretical framing.  
The second component of case study research design is to define the study purpose clearly 
[74], [75]. The purpose of this study was to develop an understanding of the risk and 
sociotechnical operational deficiencies of the case pipelines, and how the conceptualisation of 
new SCPA projects can learn from this complex example. Hence, two key definitions bind the 
case: (1) the pipeline risk i.e. failure frequencies and consequences; (2) the pipeline’s 
sociotechnical context i.e. the interactions between technical systems, organisational, 
regulatory, humans, and the environmental aspects [33]. Consequently, our unit of analysis 
focused on the “risk” and “sociotechnical context” of the case pipelines. 
The fourth component of case study research design was to connect data to propositions. This 
connection was achieved following the data collection phase, as themes emerge. We analysed 
the data whilst building explanations to the causal links that appear in the data to the 
theoretical propositions of the paper, thereby, answering the research questions. Finally, 
interpretation of findings was achieved through carefully extraction of meanings from the 
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analysis vis-à-vis the theoretical conception of the paper [72] to develop an understanding of 
the risk and sociotechnical operational deficiencies of the case pipelines, and to identify 
learning points for SCPA projects conceptualisation. 
The paper’s methodological fit [31] can be seen from four dimensions. The research seeks to 
address questions of practical and theoretical importance specific to the context of SCPA. 
Second, the study drew on existing theoretical and empirical work on approaches to project 
learning in organisational context [35], [36], [41],  project conceptualisation [3], [27] and how 
asset integrity can be achieved during project conceptualisation in a reflection cycle [53] 
without which the asset is likely to fail [4]. The theoretical framing of the paper also 
established the need for learning in project conceptualisation to go beyond project 
management processes. The study also drew on existing knowledge and the uniqueness of the 
case pipeline to justify the focus on project conceptualisation. This approach informed the 
hybrid data collection and analysis techniques used in line with the case study method 
adopted. Finally, managerial and theoretical contributions were informed by the findings of 
risk assessment and analysis of sociotechnical deficiencies of the pipelines. Yin’s tactics 
(construct validity, internal and external validity, and reliability) were carefully integrated. 
Construct validity was achieved by the used of multiple source of evidence and establishment 
of chain of evidence. Internal and external validity were addressed mainly through 
explanation building and replication logic respectively. Reliability was achieved using case 
study protocols and database such that data collection procedure can be repeated [73]. 
4.1 Data collection 
Based on the intermediate methodological fit of the study [31], data collection took a hybrid 
form. First, is the need to collect data that allows for quantification of risk, i.e., failure 
frequencies and consequences of the pipelines. To achieve this, quantitative data was 
collected including: documented data related to the design, construction, operation, and 
maintenance of the pipeline from the operator, i.e., PPMC. The data provided analytical 
13 
 
variables for understanding the characteristics of the pipelines and the operating parameters 
including: pipeline diameters, wall thickness, steel grade, length, fluid type, line capacity, 
design flow rate (min/max), design pressure, cathodic corrosion protection, depth of cover, 
etc. Historic pipeline failure data was also obtained from PPMC. This comprised data from 
thirteen years report (from 2000-2012) containing information on failures in the entire 5001 
km pipeline system across the five operation and distribution zones. Overall, the quantitative 
data was used for quantitative pipeline risk assessment as described in the data analysis 
framework in section 3.2. This provided crucial framework for systematically identifying risk 
and analysis of failure causations, consequences, and the link to ill-project conceptualisation. 
Second is the need to develop an in-depth hierarchical explanation of the sociotechnical, 
organisational and regulatory dimensions of failure causations of the case pipeline. 
Consequently, semi-structured interviews were conducted with key purposively sampled 
participants. The semi-structured interview technique was selected mainly because it provided 
the opportunity to modify the predetermined questions based upon the researcher’s perception 
of what seems most appropriate. This allowed question wording to be changed and 
explanations given; particularly questions which seem inappropriate with a particular 
interviewee can be omitted, or additional ones included [77]. As used in case study research 
[72], [73], semi-structure interviews also allowed data to be gathered and further reasoning 
behind responses to be explored, for a better understanding of the participant’s experience, 
opinion and knowledge, within the case problem [78], and a means of confirming insights and 
information the researcher already holds. Interaction between participants and the researcher 
allowed for data generation, which is an indication of the researcher's immersion in the field. 
Because of this, constructivism and interpretivism [79] commonly permeate the 
implementation of the research design. Participants were purposively sampled [77] from 
relevant departments and communities with the right affiliation and knowledge of the subject 
matter as shown in Table 1 below. For the purposes of confidentiality, the participants’ names 
and their position within their affiliated organisations are excluded.  
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Table 1: Semi-structured interview schedule 
Participants Number of 
participants 
Participants 
role 
Nigerian National Petroleum Cooperation (NNPC) 3 Asset owner 
Pipelines and Product Marketing Company (PPMC) 6 Asset operator 
Department of Petroleum Resources (DPR) 2 Asset regulator 
National Oil Spill Detection and Response Agency (NOSDRA) 4 Asset regulator 
Pipeline host communities 5 Risk receptors 
 
A total of twenty semi-structured interviews were obtained. The interviews spanned between 
forty minutes to seventy minutes and were all conducted in three interconnected sessions. The 
aim of the first session was to discuss and understand contextual risk factors and underlying 
causes of pipeline failure. In the second session, the discussion tilted towards understanding 
the regulatory and operational limitations related to the construction and operations of the 
pipeline facilities. The last session explored the possible collaboration for maximum research 
impact. All interviews were done with complete integration of ethical considerations. The 
interviews were conducted face-to-face to enhance rapport, interest and attention [77] based 
on a designed interview guide developed and tested in a preliminary pilot study with 
consideration for the research aim and purposive selection of participants based on analysis of 
stakeholders [66]. The interviews were later transcribed and analysed using the framework 
described in section 4.2.  Rigour was achieved by engaging key stakeholders and focusing on 
verification and validation. This included responsiveness of the researchers during the 
interviews, methodological coherence, appropriate sampling frame and data analysis.  
Lastly, field observation was conducted on a sampled section of the pipeline (Figure 3- 
system 2B- along the Atlas-Cove to Mosimi section) to obtained site specific data on the 
condition of ROW. The section of the pipeline inspected was purposively selected due to its 
activeness. 2B accounts for 70 per cent of the service gateway for product importation. The 
area inspected is classified under the Mosimi region. In total, about 13 kilometres of that 
section was inspected over a period of four days. Details of inspected coordinates are given in 
Table 2. The inspected area cuts across towns and countryside.    
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Figure 3: ROW inspected area 
Table 2: Coordinates of section of pipeline ROW inspected 
Start point Coordinate:       6°35'00.4"N                  3°16'15.2"E 
End point Coordinate:        6°27'55.14"N                 3°15'14.91"E 
Distance:                            13.26 km 
Initial bearing:                    008°01′00″ 
Final bearing:                     008°01′07 
Midpoint:                           06°31′28″N,    003°15′45″E 
 
As there are no standardised ROW visual inspection processes in Nigeria, the recommended 
process by the Association of Oil Pipeline was adopted. This method simply involves: (1) 
determining section of the pipeline ROW to be inspected; (2) determining the method to 
transverse ROW (in this case, foot patrol and patrol vehicle were used to transverse the 
sampled area); (3) ensuring the researcher has a clear understanding of which pipeline need to 
be inspected; the location of the pipeline; and the beginning and ending points of the pipeline, 
and documenting all notable observations on the ROW. 
4.2 Framework for data analysis  
The framework used for data analysis consisted of three interconnected elements designed to 
achieve explanatory case study data analysis. First, a quantitative pipeline risk assessment was 
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conducted to establish the pipeline failure frequency, failure consequence and risk estimation. 
There are a variety of different systems in use for risk assessment. Palmer-Jones et al. [80] 
placed the systems into three generic methods i.e. point-scoring, ranking and quantified. This 
paper considered these three methods, and tailored a method utilising analytical techniques 
that best suit context of the case pipelines. To achieve this, failure frequency was computed 
based on the model used in Ambituuni et al. [32] and De Stefani et al. [81] as the sum of 
reported failures f due to: fTPD third party damage; fMF mechanical faults; fCO corrosion; fNH 
natural hazard; and, fIN sabotage and pilferage expressed in equation 1. 
𝑓 = 𝑓𝑇𝑃𝐷 +  𝑓𝑀𝐹 +  𝑓𝐶𝑂 +  𝑓𝑁𝐻 + 𝑓𝐼𝑁   (1) 
Using historic data, the consequence of releases was also assessed at this stage. This included: 
ignition frequencies; fatality and casualty frequency. The quantitative individual risk (IR) of 
the pipeline was also computed as a measure of the frequency at which an individual, at a 
specific distance from the pipeline, may be expected to sustain a specified level of harm from 
realisation of a specific hazard. For this study, we assumed an individual at a point x,y from 
the pipeline, and adopted the calculated failure frequencies from equation. 1, and the 
associated ignition frequencies to estimate a value of IR from point x,y with equation 2.  
𝐼𝑅(𝑥,𝑦)  = ∑ (𝑓. 𝑑𝑥. 𝑝𝑖. 𝑝𝑐𝑦)𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1      (2) 
f = failure frequency (per km-yr), pi= ignition frequency, pcy = casualty frequency, dx =step 
length (m). At this point, failure and consequence characteristics of the pipelines began to 
emerge in quantitative terms.  
The second element of the data analysis involved the analysis of interview data which allowed 
making sense of causations, as well as providing in-depth explanations behind the quantitative 
results. It was important to choose the most suitable method for data analysis so the 
information obtained from the interviews could be interpreted efficiently and effectively. An 
inductive approach was utilised based on the strategy described in Braun and Clarke [82]. 
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Consequently, the thematic analysis method [83] was used to codify themes within the data to 
establish pipeline failure causal factors as well as factors contributing to the consequential 
nature of such failures. Data familiarisation was first obtained by repeated reading of the 
entire data set for ideas and identification of possible patterns. As all but one of the interviews 
was recorded in audio format, transcription provided a good opportunity for familiarisation. 
Meanings were interpreted and notes taken during this period. Afterwards, initial codes were 
produced from the data. The codes identified are features of the data that appears interesting 
to the research. The next phase involved sorting the different codes into potential themes, and 
collating all the relevant coded data extracts within the identified themes. Subsequently, 
relationships were established between themes and codes and between themes from 
participating stakeholders. Afterwards, themes were revisited and refined. Some irrelevant 
themes were excluded while similar or different themes were either collapsed to form a 
clearer cohesive theme or separated to form different themes. This ensured that the obtained 
data was reduced into meaningful categorises [82], [83].   
For the last element of the research data analysis, Rasmussen’s risk management framework 
[33][39] and Accimap [84] was used to establish a structured hierarchical understanding of 
pipeline failure causation from technical, human, organisational and regulatory perspectives. 
The result of the quantitative pipeline line risk assessment was triangulated with the result of 
the interview analysis and ROW inspection to achieve this. Accimap was used to analyse and 
link the integrity performance of the pipeline asset to its conceptualisation regime. Accimap 
analysis typically focus on failures across the following six organisational levels: government 
policy, regulatory bodies, company policies, company management, staff and physical work 
processes. By using the Accimap, a holistic view of the issues was mapped. This made it 
possible to identify the causal and contributory factors, explain the general trajectory of the 
faults across the sociotechnical pipeline systems and the interactions between them. Where 
appropriate, descriptive quotes have been used to express views of the participants.  
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The amalgamation of  data analysis tools allowed for qualitative and quantitative data to be 
blended in a hybrid approach [31] such that quantitative variables provided risk-based 
measure of the sociotechnical issues of the case pipeline and qualitative data provided in-
depth insights into dynamics of the issues. Explanatory data analysis further allowed us to 
analyse the case study data by building an explanation about the case and identifying causal 
links such that project learning is conceptualised based on the identified issues. 
5 Result and discussion 
5.1 Pipeline failure frequency (f) 
The integrity of a SCPA depends on minimal failure frequency [4]. Hence, an assessment and 
explanations of the failure frequencies and causal factors of the case pipelines was needed for 
developing an understanding of causation link to conceptualisation. Table 3 shows the 
pipelines within each distribution region and the computed failure frequency per kilometre 
year. The 13 years mean value of failure per km-year across the pipeline network stance at 
0.351 per km-year. This rate is very high compared to failure rate from other database such 
as: the Oil Company European Organisation for Environment Health and Safety 
(CONCAWE) with a computed failure rate of 0.54×10-3 and 0.24×10-3 per km-yr from 1971 
to 2011 and 2007 to 2011 respectively; United Kingdom Onshore Pipeline Operators' 
Association (UKOPA) with failure rate of 0.23×10-3 per km-yr from 1962 to 2012; and US 
with failure rate of 0.135×10-3 per km year from 1994 to 2012. 
Table 3: Failure frequencies within each NNPC distribution region 
Regions L (km) Failure incidents Failure frequencies per km year 
Port-Harcourt (PH) 1526.6 9246 0.47 
Warri (WR) 1561.2 4659 0.23 
Mosimi (MS) 512.6 3419 0.51 
Kaduna (KD) 1132.8 2443 0.17 
Gombe (GB) 267.8 2642 0.76 
Mean f value 0.351 
 
As expected, the exponential differences are mainly due to problems of vandals and 
interdictors within the pipeline systems in Nigeria. Based on equation 1, 𝑓𝐼𝑁 has a mean 
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contributory value of 96.49 per cent of the pipeline failures while failure from rupture (i.e.,fMF 
and fCO) accounted for 3.51 per cent. Whilst the act of pipeline interdiction has been attributed 
to criminal sabotage and politics of oil resources in Nigeria [85], the percentage contribution 
of 𝑓𝐼𝑁 also suggests that concerns about the sociotechnical operational context of the pipeline 
asset was ignored at the conceptualisation phase the pipeline construction. Further evidence 
from the interviews revealed that no environmental and social impact assessment (ESIA) was 
conducted at any point during the project delivery process. This finding provides a rival 
interpretation to the causes of interdiction on the pipeline beyond the politics of oil resources, 
to a more fundamental issue related to the lack of understanding of the environmental and 
social impact of the case pipeline on its host community. The scale of problem of product 
losses due to high failure frequencies can be seen in financial terms in Figure4. On average, 
the operator loses about 100 million USD per year.  
 
Figure4: Dollar value of product loss 
The findings on interdiction and failure frequencies of the case pipeline reveal lessons to learn 
for project conceptualisation of similar assets especially the need to conduct ESIA to identify 
ways to engage host communities and ensure failure from interdiction is minimised. Indeed, 
community engagement can occur during conceptualisation as a means of setting “purposes” 
to align with design concepts and the need to identify operational constraints [53]. The 
problem identification, (setting objectives) and definition (appraisal of solutions, analysis of 
risks and benefits) aspects of project conceptualisation also offer opportunities for 
conceptualisation of operational planning that allows for community engagement [32], [67] to 
occur through continuous monitoring and inspections. 
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5.2 Effect of age of pipeline on failure frequency 
The pipeline systems were classified into two according to the year of construction i.e. 
1978/80 and 1995 categories. From Table 4 it can be seen that there is a significant difference 
between failures from interdiction (fIN) across the two construction periods. The newer lines 
have a higher hit rate.  
Table 4: Pipeline age and mean failure frequency. Note that fIN is failure due to interdiction and fRup is 
failure due to rupture 
Variables N(yrs) Mean StDev Minimum Maximum 
fIN (1978/80) 13 0.493 0.428 0.057 1.180 
fIN (1995)  13 0.765 1.065 0.000 3.208 
fRup (1978/80)  13 0.02011 0.01230 0.00390 0.03902 
fRup (1995) 13 0.00203 0.00365 0.00000 0.01132 
 
This finding demonstrates the predisposition of the newer pipeline to interdiction, similar to 
the older pipelines. Indeed, this further reinforce our earlier argument on the need for project 
learning to go beyond project-based learning [46], [49] to performance-base. The case 
pipeline provides insight on how the poor integrity dynamics linked to interdiction of the 
older pipelines appeared to have been inherited and even exceeded by the newer pipelines. 
This, however, is unsurprising as the integrity management systems of both pipelines remains 
the same and weakened by deficiencies across various sociotechnical context of the pipeline 
operation as later shown in section 5.6. 
As expected, failure due to rupture (fRup) increased with pipeline age. i.e, for the 1978/80 
pipelines fRup is about 0.02 per km-year, while 0.002 per km-year was computed as the fRup for 
the 1995 pipelines. Unfortunately, the available data did not permit further analysis to 
ascertain the precise relationships, i.e. whether the ruptures are related to time dependent 
threats, e.g. internal/external corrosion and material fatigue or time independent, e.g. ground 
movement and incorrect operations. Notwithstanding, this finding suggests that there is no 
sufficient integrity-based inspection and maintenance schedule designed to fit operating 
context from the conceptualisation stage, especially as it relates to the lifespan of the pipeline. 
Indeed, ill-project conception and operational dynamics of the pipelines are evident in the fact 
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that the pipelines remain operational even after exceeding its 20 years lifespan [70], making it 
vulnerable to corrosion, material fatigue and impact damage. 
5.3 Ignition causes and frequencies (pi) 
Only the pipeline failure records from 2007 had causes of ignition. Prior to 2007, only the 
numbers of ignitions recorded per year were reported. Of the 106 ignitions recorded from 
2007 to 2012, 74 per cent were caused by vandals as shown in Figure 5.  
 
Figure 5: Ignition causal factors 
Most of the reported sources of fire from mechanical faults were associate to pump 
overheating, failed mechanical seal, electrical fault and auto ignition. Sparks from electric 
overhead cables, bush burning for hunting purposes, and construction activities were mostly 
the sources of fire from third part damage (TPD). We observed an interesting insight from the 
way the operator report and linked ignition causations to factors that on the surface seem 
unavoidable and are mere part of day to day safety critical operations (e.g., pump overheating, 
electrical fault, and auto ignition). This practice ignores the link between such faults and 
deficiencies in the sociotechnical operating system of the case pipelines. The implication of 
these practices on safety and integrity performance of the pipelines can be argued from two 
perspectives. First, the operator is unable to accept responsibility for its poor safety 
performance and, therefore, unable to see faults in its safety systems and procedures which 
could, otherwise, be a pivot for learning especially in the context of conceptualising new 
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assets. Second, such practice will avert criticism and regulatory sanctions of safety 
performance which may lead to a false sense of safety and integrity management capabilities.  
To further evaluate any observable differences in the reported ignition frequencies across the 
NNPC distribution regions the ignition per failure incidents in each region was calculated. 
From Table 5, Port-Harcourt region (PH), Warri (WR), Mosimi (MS) and Kaduna regions all 
have ignition per failure incidents within the same range, while Gombe (GB) region recorded 
the lowest ignition frequency of approximately 1 in 100 reported failures.  
Table 5: Ignition frequencies within NNPC-PPMC distribution regions 
Regions 
Pipeline failure (2000 to 
2012) 
Fire incidents (2000 to 2012) Ignition frequency 
PH 9246 206 2.23E-02 
WR 4659 122 2.62E-02 
MS 3419 76 2.22E-02 
KD 2443 50 2.05E-02 
GB 2642 27 1.02E-02 
 
There are questions as to the reason why ignition rate is high in PH, WR and MS regions. 
Perhaps this could be associated to the flash point of the petroleum products involved. 
However, the overall rate of ignition per pipeline failure exposes the deficiency in emergency 
response and limitations in the leak detection and incident response technologies. Indeed, the 
ignition frequency dynamics of the pipeline offers learning on the link between the design 
criteria element (e.g. ensuring risk of the asset is ALARP) and the acceptability of risk 
through the design and implementation of robust integrity management systems which will 
minimise ignition frequencies and reduce failure consequences. 
5.4 Fatality  
The consequences of the high ignition frequencies computed above can be seen in the fatality 
record of the pipeline system as represented in  
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Table 6. The pipeline systems in PH, WR and MS regions recorded fatality of 0.044, 0.071 
and 0.38 per km-yr. However, surprisingly, KD region recorded no fatality even though the 
ignition frequency in that region is similar to ignition frequencies in PH, WR and MS. As 
discovered during the pipeline ROW inspection, other influencing factors such as poor 
pipeline route planning, the proximity of buildings to the pipelines and ease of access to 
incident sites contribute to pipeline failure consequences.  
 
Table 6: Fatalities from1998 to 2012  
Regions Fatality report (1998 to 2012) 
PH 1004 
WR 1665 
MS 2889 
KD 0 
GB 0 
 
5.5 Individual risk (IR)  
IR of a SCPA is defined as the fatality rate at a point x,y if someone would be present at that 
point 100 per cent of the time unprotected by clothes or buildings [2]. When a pipeline is 
designed with optimal integrity management system, the IR value is such that people living 
within the vicinity of the asset are safe from the minimised failure probability and 
consequence. Developing such an integrity system requires understanding of factors such as 
the failure dynamics of the pipeline, proximity of people, routing, emergency response 
procedures and risk communication to be conceptualised when designing and operating the 
pipeline, without which the value of IR will be considered intolerable.  Figure 6 illustrates the 
calculated IR associated with the section of the pipeline inspected. The figure also illustrates 
the adopted IR limits established by PD8010 [2] because of its general appropriateness within 
the global pipeline industry best practices. At about 40 metres from the pipeline, the IR value 
is not within tolerable limits. Above 40 metres the IR value is tolerable if the risk is ALARP. 
The ROW inspection conducted during this study revealed that in many cases buildings and 
other public infrastructures are located less than a meter from the pipeline. This may be the 
reason for the high fatality rates recorded which affects the IR values along the pipeline. The 
focus on attaining tolerable IR levels for conceptualising, constructing and operating SCPA 
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with similar characteristics should, therefore, be on integrating the aforementioned factors in 
order to mitigate the risk associated to the failure of such asset.  
 
Figure 6: Pipeline IR values 
Indeed, beyond the measure of risk and the learning thereof identified for SCPA project 
conceptualisation, what is important is the manner in which sociotechnical deficiencies are 
likely to weak failure prevention barriers of the asset. The next section analyses how this 
happens in the case pipeline as a means of establishing what SCPA project conceptualisation 
learning can be further identified from such deficiencies. 
5.6 Hierarchical description of pipeline failure causes 
The risk associated with the case pipelines was assessed using failure records and pipeline 
design and construction data and the results presented in sections 5.1 to 5.5 above. This 
section combined the risk assessment with the result of the analysis of semi-structured 
interviews conducted and site observation to explore the “faults” and the interactions within 
the holistic pipeline sociotechnical complex systems and how these faults offer learning for 
the conceptualisation of similar assets. The result of the analysis is shown in Figure 7.   
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Figure 7: AcciMap showing the interaction of pipeline failure causal factors and factors contributing to elevated failure impact  
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The first failure-causal theme explores governmental and regulatory issues. At both levels, the 
limitations in the regulatory framework of the pipeline are attributed to government’s sole 
involvement in the construction, operations and regulations of the pipelines. During the project 
delivery stage of the pipelines, the government took no consideration of the host communities and, 
over the years, this has become a point of grievance. The interviewed stakholders agreed that the 
pipeline was constructed without an ESIA. Also, due to regulatory deficiencies at governmental 
levels, the regulator (DPR) appears to be deliberately weakened as they equally receive administrative 
directives from the Minister of Petroleum Resources (as illustrated by the interview citation below). 
This strategic organisational misalignment weakens the pipeline integrity through defective regulatory 
systems. Indeed, in the conceptualisation of new assets attention needs to go beyond reducing pipeline 
risk through the technical design of the asset to strengthen the failure prevention barrier. This can be 
achieved by integrating an organisational capability assessment into project conceptualisation phase.  
 “There was a time when DPR was buried right inside NNPC, at that time it was just a 
small office in Lagos, their salaries, and everything was together…so, I am sure once DPR 
steps-in by attempting to be strict, some people will tap them on the shoulder and say: hey 
slow it down.  This oil is getting Nigeria about 80 per cent of its income, so we don’t want 
any hustle” (NNPC interviewee). 
The next failure-causation theme explores faults at company (NNPC and PPMC) level. Not 
surprising, issues such as poor safety culture and limited safety awareness came top of the list. These 
issues can be traced to lack of top management commitment as even the operator admits the 
inadequacy in their safety organisational structure. When asked about their organisational challenges, 
the responders noted that: 
“Almost every aspect of implementing the Health Safety and Environmental Management 
System, there is a challenge for us….The (organisational) structure: there is also a 
problem there.” (PPMC interviewee). 
“The major challenges we have is the structural position of the HSE department. If you 
look that the organisational structure of HSE department in Shell or other multinational 
oil and gas company, the position of the HSE department is a direct link to the CEO of 
such organisations. It is not the case in NNPC…” (NNPC interviewee). 
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This lack of commitment gives rise to poor safety culture and bottlenecks the allocation of resource 
[66] which also limits the technical know-how of running, maintaining and optimising the integrity of 
the pipelines. Evidently, NNPC and PPMC are not capable of owning and operating such SCPA. The 
last theme identified issues associated with operational and technical (work) levels and the pipeline 
operating environment. The pipeline operator (PPMC) lamented that its ROW maintenance staff are 
stressed and sometimes inexperienced. This makes it practically impossible to effectively patrol the 
ROW. Indeed, an organisation wishing to operate a SCPA can identify and mitigate these issues 
through an in-depth organisational capability assessment during the project conceptualisation stage. 
“Go and check…is there any part of the world where you have over 5000 kilometres of 
pipelines and the number of people maintaining it is less than 100? Will they be able to go 
round and ensure that it is safe? There are even no funds to do the job.” (PPMC 
interviewee). 
The condition of the ROW is an important factor in understanding the degree of control the operator 
has in maintaining good industry practice and avoiding third party interference. ROW condition also 
influences incident impact on safety and environment based on proximity of receptors and 
accessibility for emergency response.  In  
Table 7, the key findings from the risk-based field observation conducted are summarised. From the 
inspection result, there is an obvious case of inadequate maintenance of the pipeline ROW. There are 
issues with encroachment of buildings. This increases the vulnerability of the pipeline to threats from 
third party activities and the consequences of failure as close proximity to pipeline increase the values 
of IR of the pipelines. Incident response can also be constrained by the proximity of buildings to 
ROW. The operator also claimed that it has become difficult to maintain the ROW (as cited below) 
due to the hostile attitude of host communities which has earlier been linked to lack of community 
engagement, a direct consequence of not conducting ESIA during project conceptualisation. 
“Sometime when we hear about a break in our line, we get there, and the community will 
not allow us access the line. In some cases, they tell us to pay access fee, or to pay for 
compensation before fixing it”. (PPMC interviewee). 
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Table 7: Findings from risk based inspection of ROW 
ROW Condition Description 
Evidence of spills or 
discharge from pipeline 
No active leaks or spills were detected. However, there were about 3 spotted 
evidence of spills, possibly from past incidents as shown in Figure 8A. There 
are also vast areas of oil films on both land and water around Ijegun area. The 
researcher found no evidence of clean-up activities within that location. 
 
In one location, close to Onilu Village, the vegetation is vastly burnt (see Figure 
8B), possibly from a fire incident from spilled product. In Dec 2012, NNPC 
reported a fire within the Mosimi region. Onilu village is located within this 
region. 
Forest encroachment on 
ROW 
While some sections of the ROW along country-sides remain clear, some 
sections alone Amuwo Odofin and Ije Ododo area are completely overgrown by 
grasses and trees. There are evidence of farming activities, timbering and 
excavation alone the ROW in Ije Ododo area. A section of the pipeline ROW is 
now used as access road, popularly called “the pipeline road” by the locals  
Encroachment of 
development 
A more disturbing aspect of the ROW condition is the indiscriminate and 
uncontrolled developments of buildings and roads on the ROW especially 
within Amuwo Odofin area, Ije-Ododo area, and Ijegu area. In some cases, 
shops and residential buildings are located less than a metre away from the 
pipeline markers which suggested that such developments are sadly located on 
the ROW.  
Blasting within distance 
that could impact the 
pipeline 
No evidence of blasting or mining activities were detected 
Damage to pipeline 
makers and signage 
At various locations around the Ijegu area, pipeline markers have been found 
either damaged, blocked with overgrown vegetation or worn-out and unreadable 
(see Figure 8C) 
Exposure of pipeline While no evidence of pipeline exposure was found, there is evidence of 
deliberate attempts to dig up and expose pipeline for pilferage (see Figure 8D).  
Active act of interdiction The researcher did not experience any active act of interdiction within the 
inspected area. However, evidence in the form of pictures were given by the 
ROW department of PPMC.  
 
 
Figure 8: Condition of sampled pipeline ROW 
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Lack of contextual pipeline regulatory code of practice affects the regulators ability to deploy and 
adhere to best practice operational and technical procedures. Moreover, poor technical capabilities 
generated as a result of the absence of a robust national standard meant that PPMC is unable to 
employ and retain staff with the required experience and skills.  
In all, the influence of these identified failure causal factors gives rise to multiple failure causation. 
Active events such as interdiction on the pipeline although seen from the risk assessment result as the 
immediate cause of most failures are in fact a manifestation of interactions between faults within the 
sociotechnical operating structure of the pipeline, arguably, caused by poor project conceptualisation. 
Faults such as organisational and regulatory issues, lack of human and technical capabilities, limited 
safety commitment, poor safety culture, obsolete technologies, and inappropriate ROW acquisition 
and maintenance have rendered failure prevention barriers ineffective within the entire pipeline 
systems in three ways. First is the lack of barriers or existence of weak barriers such that preventive 
measures are either missing or ineffective. These missing or weakened barriers are both in the form of 
physical and procedural conditions. For example, from the physical perspective, poor pipeline routing 
and the encroachment of buildings into the ROW has weakened the “barrier” in the form of buffer 
zone which is required to restrict the activities of third parties by reducing their proximity to the 
pipeline. Second, the faults identified also limit the availability of resources so that necessary means 
to counter or neutralise pipeline failure is constrained.  
Lastly, precarious conditions are also generated from the identified faults such that small active failure 
results in high consequence accident due to inappropriate response strategies or inadequate risk 
communication. For instance, some people within the host communities are not aware that petroleum 
products have flash points – defined as the lowest temperature at which a liquid (usually a petroleum 
product) will form a vapour in the air near its surface that will “flash,” or briefly ignite, on exposure to 
an open flame [4]. As cited by an interviewee, these people engage in risky activities such as scooping 
petroleum products from failed pipelines or even coming out to look as products leaks out.  
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“Our people don’t know the danger of this fuel. They think fuel is just like the water they 
fetch from the river or their wells. They hear of fuel, fuel, fuel, fuel, so when a leak 
occurred, they logically went to take a look at it.” (Community leader). 
People’s understanding of pipeline risk needs to be assessed at the pre-front end engineering design 
(pre-FEED) stage of project conceptualisation to draw on the knowledge of the local stakeholders 
through a facilitated process. This will provide a useful understanding of the local population and 
their understanding of the risk associated with pipelines.  
6 Empirical and managerial implication  
The risk associated with a SCPA was assessed and the sociotechnical deficiencies of the pipeline 
analysed. Some key considerations for project conceptualisation were identified as the lessons to be 
learned when conceptualising new similar assets. The assessment showed that third party interference 
is the major cause of failure to the pipelines, accounting for over 96 per cent of pipeline failure. These 
failures were found to be attributed to lack of community engagement during and after the 
conceptualisation stage of the asset. The pipelines recorded a failure frequency of 0.35 per km-year 
which have been found to be well above failure frequencies reported on other pipeline systems around 
the world (e.g., the UK and USA). Consequently, the ignition frequencies, fatality, and product losses 
from the Nigerian pipelines were found to be high. This made the values of individual risk for the 
pipelines to fall outside tolerable limits. Fatalities from pipeline failures range from 0.04 to 0.38 per 
km-yr, depending on the region of operations in Nigeria. As established in this study, on average, the 
operator of the pipeline system loses about $US100 million/year due to these failures. These findings 
reveal a strong link between the robustness of project conceptualisation, particularly of the need to 
have stakeholder buy-in and asset integrity. 
One of the more significant findings to emerge from this study, revealed the need to assess 
organisational capabilities with respect to owning, operating and regulating SCPA. It is evident that 
there needs to be an alignment of capabilities from both the regulator and operator to ensure robust 
accident prevention barriers are in place. The literature reviewed [66], [67], [71] confirmed that the 
operator and regulator need to understand their commitment to ensuring consistent optimised asset 
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integrity at regulatory, organisational, management and work levels. Without this commitment, the 
deficiencies identified in the asset case example used in this study, which includes regulatory capture, 
poor management commitment on the side of the operator, poor safety culture of the operator, limited 
technical knowhow and limited safety commitment, will weaken the accident prevention barriers.  
The findings from this study further underline valuable lessons to learn for project conceptualisation 
of a SCPA with vital generalisability which practitioners can draw from to comprehend the effects of 
poor project conceptualisation on the integrity and safety performance of systems in other safety 
critical industries. Moreover, given that failure due to poor conceptualisation of sociotechnical 
systems is even more critical when operating in environments with poor institutional control, the 
issues highlighted in this study is particularly relevant for the management of safety critical assets in 
these environments. 
7 Theoretical contribution 
The findings of this study reinforced the theoretical link between project conceptualisation and asset 
integrity, and recognised the need to have a robust project conceptualisation process to ensure the 
integrity of a petroleum asset is maintained across its lifecycle. The research drew on the risk-based 
performance of an existing pipeline to identify how new assets can learn from the integrity 
deficiencies of the case pipeline, hence, expanding the theoretical conception of learning in project 
conceptualisation beyond project management processes to lessons from safety and integrity 
performance of similar asset. The core of activities for project conceptualisation should, therefore, go 
beyond understanding the most effective and efficient way of delivering the project, and address how 
the delivered project will perform throughout its lifecycle. We have demonstrated how this can be 
achieved in Figure 9 below. First is the need to adopt a dynamic view of project conceptualisation 
[38] and then allow for knowledge creation [35], [48] through performance-based learning of issues 
affecting the safety and integrity performance of similar assets as identified using the case example of 
a challenging pipeline asset in Nigeria. 
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Figure 9. Performance-based project conceptualisation learning framework for SCPA 
Indeed, the result of risk assessment of the case pipeline demonstrates some of the theoretical 
dimensions of learning that should be conceptualised when conceptualising the “value” (asset 
integrity) whilst establishing the “purpose” of a new project. Performance-based learning from 
stakeholder and community understanding of risks, organisational and regulatory capabilities, and 
safety consequences of failures should form part of the learning reflective cycle in order to ensure that 
operation concept design of new assets adequately reflect how the asset will be used before the design 
and construction stage is delivered. This will allow proactive risk management technical 
specifications to be established. Once this is established, attention can turn to design of the asset itself 
and how to construct the asset. Notably, also, this should not be seen as a one-off process, but 
executed in a loop [37] given the imperfect understanding of stakeholder requirements at this point.   
As the project moves to the design stage, design criteria need to be formulated based on acceptability 
of risk obtained from knowledge of performance of similar assets. For instance, as shown in this 
study, the acceptable limit for IR of the case pipeline stands at 40 metres if the risk is ALARP due to 
the close proximity of buildings and public infrastructure. New and similar assets, faced with similar 
constraint can, therefore, learn by integrating the need for relocating risk receptors within their IR risk 
contours or developing mitigation strategies that reduces the probability of failure within its design 
criteria. Moreover, given the case example illustrates that a system’s operational capabilities are a 
function of its safety and integrity performance, the design criteria of such system, when 
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conceptualised, needs to look closely at the technical knowhow of both the operator and regulators. 
Indeed, at this early project stage, design conceptions may be constraint by lack of clarity on the 
integrity objectives of the asset, hence the need to look beyond the project itself to integrate lessons 
from similar sociotechnical systems. Because of the scope of the dynamic view on project 
conceptualisation, the aforementioned model of loop execution will allow the redefinition of safety 
and integrity performance even after construction and testing. Consequently, as the asset undergoes 
operational integration across Rasmussen’s operating sociotechnical levels, industry lessons can 
continuously be integrated vis-à-vis the analysis of design and performance of the assets itself.    
8 Conclusion 
This study presented a risk-based assessment of a case pipeline in Nigeria to identify the issues related 
to the risk and sociotechnical operational deficiencies of the pipelines, and how the conceptualisation 
of new SCPA projects can learn from these issues. To achieve this three research questions were set 
and addressed using explanatory case study method as follows: 
RQ1: The failure frequencies of pipelines were found to be exponentially high (0.351 per km-yr). The 
results indicate that third party interference is the major cause of failure to the pipelines, accounting 
for over ninety-six per cent of pipeline failure. This was found to be attributed to poor asset integrity 
management capabilities and lack of community engagement during and after the conceptualisation 
stage of the asset. The findings further revealed a strong link between the significance of project 
conceptualisation, particularly of the need to have stakeholder buy-in to achieve asset integrity. The 
catastrophic nature of failures can be seen in the high frequencies of ignition and fatality. Ignition and 
fatality frequencies are high because of deficiencies in emergency response, weak leak detection and 
incident responds strategies, close proximity of buildings and people, and lack of risk communication 
all of which are strongly linked to weakness in the design and operation of the pipelines. This makes 
the value of IR intolerable. This finding accord with an observation made in the literature, which 
suggested that failure consequences can be reduced via the design of emergency systems and ROW 
pivoted on the concerns of risk receptors [29], [69], [71] during project conceptualisation. 
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RQ2: The case pipeline illustrates how deficiencies within sociotechnical context including regulatory 
capture, poor management commitment on the side of the operator, poor safety culture of the 
operator, limited technical knowhow and limited safety commitment hierarchically interact to weaken 
failure prevention barriers. This finding revealed the need for assessing organisational capabilities 
with respect to owning, operating and regulating SCPA during project conceptualisation. 
RQ3: Managerial practice can learn from some of the key issues identified from the case pipelines 
whilst conceptualising SCPA projects by adopting a dynamic view of project conceptualisation and 
allowing for project knowledge creation through performance-based learning of issues affecting 
similar SCPA. We argued that this framework, though context specific, has general application to 
other safety critical industries, thereby, contributing to literature on sociotechnical asset integrity 
optimisation and project conceptualisation learning e.g. [1], [37], [56], [86]. 
Finally, two important limitations need to be considered. First is the need to identify that findings 
presented, although provided opportunity for practitioners to comprehend the effects of poor project 
conceptualisation is also likely to be affected by wider issues which may not be a direct link to the 
conceptualisation process of the asset. For instance, there are studies which highlighted the general 
poor safety culture of the Nigeria the petroleum industry [66]. Moreover, there is also documented 
evidence of pipeline sabotage related to the politics of petroleum resource in the Niger-Delta region of 
Nigeria [21]. Second is a limitation related to the comprehensiveness of data used. Obtaining 
comprehensive data was especially challenging for this study due to the secretive nature of the 
petroleum industry in Nigeria. For example, we experienced deliberate deletion of some key details 
from the pipeline failure reports due to confidentiality claims. This constrained further analysis, (i.e. it 
was not possible to ascertain the relationship between aging of the pipeline, failure frequency and 
project conceptualisation). The secretive nature of the Nigerian petroleum industry was also observed 
during the interview data collection stage of the research. Participants tended to ‘play safe’ while 
being interviewed. However, in general, the interviews provided valuable opportunities for the authors 
to gain first-hand knowledge of various elements of the research, without which the research would 
not have been successful. 
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